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11 Introduction
As copying of digital content has become easier, content vendors have started to protect
their property with technology rather than relying on legal protections. Technical
protections, such as encryption and copy controls, are often lumped together with
licensing privileges under the name “digital rights management (DRM).” The purpose
of this paper is to explore at least one business model of how technical protections
might be provided, and its eﬀect on the pricing of entertainment products.
Technical protections have been evolving since the 1980s. Some have been
industry-wide eﬀorts such as the Serial Copy Management System for digital audio
tape that was authorized by Congress. This system caused the quality of copies to
degrade, so that, as with analog audio tapes, it was hard to make faithful copies
of copies. The solution was inelegant at best, but in any case became obsolete due
to the proliferation of other digital mediums. Other measures were introduced by
vendors themselves, such as the one-installation features imposed by some distributors
of computer software. One-installation features were rapidly circumvented.
As content distribution has moved to the Internet, watermark and encryption
technologies have developed. A watermark, by analogy with a watermark on paper
stationery, is a piece of software code embedded in a program. If illicit copies of
the software circulate, the watermark can identify the original buyer or licensee of
the copy that is circulating. This may or may not be useful, depending on whether
the original buyer or licensee can be held liable. Encryption systems attempt to make
digital content uninterpretable or inaccessible without use of a code key. The code key
generally authorizes playing the content on a speciﬁc piece of hardware. For example,
the movie industry has developed digital versatile disks (DVDs), which are protected
by a technology called the Content Scrambling System (CSS). CSS authorizes access
by matching a code embedded in disks to a code embedded in DVD players. Among
other purposes, this system ensures that movies released for viewing in one region of
the world cannot be viewed in another. Similarly, Apple Computer’s music player,
1iPod, is equipped with a decryption ability called Fairplay that allows the user to
download and play music from their online music store iTunes.
Two markets are implicated in technical protections: the market for players
and the market for content. Since the market for players is mostly derived from the
market for content, this raises questions about whether the player market can capture
the value of the underlying content, and thus undermine the incentive for creation.
Market power in the player market has, in fact, raised antitrust concerns. For
example, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division investigated the licensing agree-
ments that govern the DVD and MPEG patent pools. In VirginMega v. Apple,t h e
French antitrust authorities considered an antitrust claim to force the licensing of
FairPlay. The DOJ issued favorable review letters on DVD and MPEG, since the
patents in the pool are complements (Shapiro 2001). The French antitrust author-
ities also dismissed the antitrust claim against Apple. However, critics have not
been assuaged, and have now taken their complaint to legislative bodies. Various
national governments in Europe, including France, have proposed legislation to force
interoperability.
The DVD technology and the iTunes technology diﬀer in their relationships to
the content industry. The DVD technology is largely owned by the content vendors,
at least on the software side, while iTunes is owned by a hardware manufacturer.
M a n u f a c t u r e r so fD V Dp l a y e r sm u s tp a yf e e st ot h eM o t i o nP i c t u r e sE x p e r tG r o u p
(MPEG) for digital video and audio algorithms called “codecs”, as well as to the DVD
Copy Control Association (DVD-CCA) for the Content Scramble System (CSS), and
to a pool administered by Toshiba on aspects of the hardware. MPEG includes content
companies, and DVD-CCA is controlled primarily by the content industry.
Disentangling the relationship between the content market and the player mar-
ket is not trivial, since the demand for players is derived from the demand for content.
The main harm that might arise from monopolization of the player market is that it
could divert proﬁt from creators, and thus erode the incentive to create. However,
2there is a natural antidote: content vendors can implement and maintain their own
protection systems, either independently or through a shared protection platform. In
this paper, we ask whether that solution raises new problems for competition. We
explore the eﬀect on content prices when a costly digital rights management system
is owned and controlled by the content providers.
In section 2, we show that the mere fact of cost sharing has a collusive impact.
If ﬁrms share cost according to their shares of total demand, a vendor can reduce its
share of the cost by raising price and thus reducing demand. In fact, we show that
“demand-based” cost sharing leads to higher prices than “revenue-based” cost sharing,
although both put upward pressure on price.
In section 3 we introduce the idea that the level of protection is an endogenous
choice, and argue that a threat of circumvention has a moderating eﬀect on prices.
We assume that the cost of protection rises with the level of protection, where the
level of protection is calibrated by the cost of circumventing it. Considering only the
collusive eﬀect of cost sharing, the level of protection that maximizes the ﬁrms’ joint
proﬁts may or may not be high enough to deter circumvention. If not, the ﬁrms will
sell at lower prices.
In section 4, we ask whether the ﬁrms will prefer independent systems or a
shared system, and whether their choice accords with eﬃciency. Independent systems
can lead to either higher prices or lower prices, and can lead to either lower costs or
higher costs. Separate systems have the advantage of being a less attractive hacking
target. Therefore the vendors have less incentive to keep prices low to avoid hack-
ing. However, a shared system has the advantage of facilitating collusion through
cost sharing. These eﬀects on prices work in opposite directions. There are also
countervailing eﬀects on costs. The costs of independent systems may be lower be-
cause the required level of protection is lower, but higher because the setup costs must
be duplicated. The ﬁrms’ desire to reduce costs will encourage them to make the
socially eﬃcient decision whether to share, but their desire to collude may work in the
opposite direction.
3In section 5 we consider the extent to which there can be “collusion through
technology,” in the sense that vendors can design the technological capabilities to
facilitate or avoid independent pricing.
The ideas in this paper are related to an older literature of the 1980’s about
the feared harms of photocopying. These include, for example, the papers of Novos
and Waldman (1984), and Besen and Kirby (1989), who were focused mainly on
the cost and quality of copies, and how the market for copies aﬀects the price of
originals and consumer welfare more generally. In contrast, we assume that digital
copies are faithful to the original, and that the cost of copying is endogenous to the
level of protection, which we take as an optimizing choice of vendors. More recently,
authors have focused on government interventions as a solution to digital copying. For
example, Chen and Png (2003) characterize optimal ﬁnes for copying, in conjunction
with subsidies and taxes, which collectively can mitigate the harms of digital copying.
We follow Conner and Rumelt (1991) in our premise that the threat of copy-
ing will cause vendors to lower their prices. (See Sundararajan (2004) for empirical
evidence for the existence of DRM price eﬀects.) We follow Belleﬂamme (2003) in
noticing that a shared DRM system aﬀects pricing behavior through the threat of
hacking. In Belleﬂamme’s paper, demands would be independent if the vendors had
perfect legal enforcement, but demands become interdependent if hacking is a threat.
We depart from these papers in assuming that the level of protection (cost of hack-
ing) is endogenous, and in the welfare questions we address. It may be easier to
deter hacking with separate DRM systems than with a shared DRM system. We
therefore investigate the choice between independent and shared protections, and how
it compares to what is optimal. We also investigate the eﬀect on prices of how the
shared system is governed, in particular, comparing demand-based cost sharing with
revenue-based cost sharing.
42 Cost Sharing as a Collusive Device
We will make our arguments in a simple model with two sellers of substitute propri-
etary products. To focus on the governance of prices without getting bogged down
in asymmetries between the ﬁrms, we will assume that the ﬁrms are in symmetric
positions. In particular, they face demands D1(p1,p 2),D 2(p1,p 2), each decreasing in
its own price and nondecreasing in the other ﬁrm’s price. By symmetry we mean that
for all (a,b),D 1(a,b)=D2(b,a). We assume that production costs are zero so that,
ignoring any costs of technical protection, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are the same as revenues:
Ri(p1,p 2)=piDi(p1,p 2) for i =1 ,2 (1)
We shall assume that a symmetric equilibrium exists (the relevant conditions are
included in Assumption 1 below) and will use
¡
pM,p M¢
for the symmetric equilibrium
prices when the ﬁrms, respectively, maximize (1).
Suppose that the content providers deploy a technical protection system in
order to avoid piracy of the product, and suppose that they share the ﬁxed cost of
the system. To isolate the pure eﬀect of cost sharing, we ﬁrst suppose that eﬀective
protection has a ﬁxed cost. (We later relax this assumption and introduce a “no-
hacking” constraint to endogenize this cost. See section 3.) We consider three ways
of sharing the ﬁxed cost:
1. according to shares of downloads (demand-based cost sharing);
2. according to shares of revenue (revenue-based cost sharing);
3. according to ﬁxed shares.




, provided that both ﬁrms remain in the market. The main result
of this section is to show that the ﬁrst two cost-sharing schemes will lead to higher
5prices, and, further, that demand-based cost sharing is more collusive than revenue-
based cost sharing, in the sense of leading to higher prices. Thus, the content vendors
will be better oﬀ with a system that tracks downloads but not ﬁnancial transactions.
To deﬁne the games that result from the ﬁrst and second cost sharing rules, we




D1(p1,p2)+D2(p1,p2) if D1(p1,p 2)+D2(p1,p 2) > 0





R1(p1,p2)+R2(p1,p2) if R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) > 0
1/2 if R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2)=0
(3)
The demand-based cost share ˜ α1 is increasing with demand D1 and decreasing
with the other ﬁrm’s demand, D2, hence decreasing with the vendor’s own price p1.
By increasing its price, the vendor reduces its cost share, which makes a high price
more attractive than it otherwise would be. This suggests that with demand-based
cost sharing, prices will be higher than with ﬁxed cost shares.
The revenue-based cost share ¯ α1 can be either increasing or decreasing with
p1, since R1 can be either increasing or decreasing with p1. Even if the cost share ¯ α1
decreases with p1 like ˜ α1, it decreases at a smaller rate — revenue decreases less quickly
than demand as price rises, because the increase in price oﬀsets the fall in demand.
This suggests that there is less incentive to raise price with revenue-based cost sharing
than with demand-based cost sharing, and that prices will be lower. We now show
this.
We consider three diﬀerent games, with payoﬀ functions deﬁned by the cost
shares given by (1), (2), and (3), respectively. That is, we suppose that the shared
cost of protection is some K, and the resulting protection prevents piracy. The proﬁt
6functions in the three games are respectively
˜ π
K
1 (p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2) − ˜ α1(p1,p 2)K
¯ π
K
1 (p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2) − ¯ α1(p1,p 2)K (4)
ˆ π
K
1 (p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2) − ˆ α1K
Let p
˜ I (K),p
¯ I (K),p M be, respectively, the symmetric equilibrium prices in the
games deﬁned by these proﬁt functions, assuming that symmetric equilibria exist.
To compare the equilibrium prices, we need some assumptions on the proﬁt
functions. Let ∂
∂p1˜ πK
1 (·) and ∂
∂p1R1(·) represent partial derivatives with respect to the
ﬁrst argument (and analogously for the second argument, for second partial deriva-
tives and for other functions). The following assumption is not disaggregated into
separate assumptions on revenue and cost because it is more straightforward to state
t h ea s s u m p t i o ni nt h ef o r mi ti su s e d .O u ro b j e c t i v ei st oe n s u r et h a tt h e r ei sau n i q u e
symmetric equilibrium, as that allows us to sort out the eﬀects of cost sharing with
least clutter.
Assumption 1. For the revenue and proﬁt functions deﬁned in (1) and (4),
and every K>0,
(a) The proﬁt functions are quasiconcave in own price on domains where they are
positive.1


















1But it would not be reasonable to assume that the proﬁt functions are quasiconcave on the whole
domain. Consider the proﬁt function ¯ πK
1 . If ﬁrm 2 is pricing so that it earns positive revenue, ﬁrm
1 can earn zero revenue and zero proﬁts by pricing very low or very high. At intermediate prices
that generate revenue, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt may be negative because it must share the costs. But then the
proﬁt function is not quasiconcave.
7The main point of Proposition 1 is that cost sharing elevates the equilibrium
prices, and that demand-based cost sharing is more collusive than revenue-based cost
sharing. Among the three symmetric prices compared, the lowest is pM,n a m e l y ,t h e
price that would arise in equilibrium with ﬁxed cost shares. Provided the supplier is
n o ta l l o w e dt oa v o i dt h ec o s tb ys u p p l y i n gn o t h i n g( a sa s s u m e di nt h ep r o ﬁt functions),
this equilibrium price is the same for all K, and also the same as with perfect legal
enforcement, since the ﬁxed cost share does not aﬀect the strategic incentive to change
price.
Proposition 1 thus shows that cost sharing can be collusive. Since p
¯ I (K) <
p
˜ I(K), demand-based cost sharing leads to higher prices than revenue-based cost shar-
ing.
Proposition 1 (The pure eﬀe c to fc o s ts h a r i n go np r i c e s )Suppose that assump-
tion 1 holds. Given K>0, let p
¯ I(K), p
˜ I(K),p M be unique symmetric equilibria of
the games deﬁned by the proﬁt functions (4), and suppose that the vendors earn pos-
itive proﬁts in the equilibria. Then pM ≤ p
¯ I (K) <p
˜ I (K) with strict inequality if




Proof: We ﬁrst show that pM <p
¯ I (K). The ﬁrst-order conditions are the










R1 (p1,p 2) − K
∂
∂p1























Using Assumption 1(b), (p1,p 2) cannot be an equilibrium if p1 = p2 <p M because
∂
∂p1¯ πK
1 (p1,p 2) > 0. At p1 = p2 <p M it holds that ∂
∂p1R1 (p1,p 2) > 0 and ∂
∂p1R1 (p1,p 2)+
8∂
∂p1R2 (p1,p 2) > 0. Therefore ﬁrm 1 can increase proﬁtb yi n c r e a s i n gp r i c e . A tp1 =
p2 = pM, ∂
∂p1¯ πK




can be an equilibrium
with revenue-based cost sharing), but ∂
∂p1¯ πK
1 (p1,p 2) > 0 if ∂
∂p1R2 (p1,p 2) > 0.
We now show that p
¯ I (K) <p











1 (p1,p 2) −
KR1 (p1,p 2)






R1 (p1,p 2)+R2 (p1,p 2)
¶
D1 (p1,p 2)
Thus, at every symmetric price, p1 = p2, ∂
∂p1˜ πK
1 (p1,p 2) > ∂
∂p1¯ πK
1 (p1,p 2), and similarly




˜ I(·) are increasing follows from the fact that our assumptions
guarantee a unique equilibrium that is symmetric, and from ∂˜ α1(p1,p 2)/∂p1 < 0,
∂¯ α1(p1,p 2)/∂p1 < 0 (similarly for ﬁrm 2) at p1 = p2 >p M. The latter condition im-
plies that the cross partial of ﬁrm i’s proﬁtf u n c t i o ni ni t so w np r i c epi and in K are
positive.2 Q.E.D.
3 Cost Sharing and the No-Hacking Constraint
We now assume that the cost of protection depends on the level of protection, say
e. Accordingly, let K (·) be a positive function of e such that K0 (·) > 0,K 00 (·) > 0
for e>0. We calibrate e to be the cost of circumventing the system. A user will
circumvent the protection system whenever the value he receives from piracy is lower
than the cost of circumvention, e. The value he receives from pirating each product
is the lesser of his willingness to pay or the price.3 Users are willing to bear a higher
2If these conditions held globally, we could use the monotone-comparative-statics theorems of
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) (Theorem 6) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) (Theorem 13).
3We are assuming here that users can circumvent for personal use without detection, but that
any attempt to post the circumvention tool or the illicitly received content on the internet would be
9cost to circumvent a shared system than a single ﬁrm’s system, because the shared
system gives access to more products, namely, those of both ﬁrms.
We assume that ﬁrms using a shared system will choose strong enough pro-
tection to deter hacking by users who would otherwise be willing to purchase both
products at the posted prices, as well as those who want to consume only one of the
products.4 Thus we impose the following no-hacking constraint:
p1 + p2 ≤ e
With the no-hacking constraint, increasing the level of protection e increases the equi-
librium prices for two reasons. First, as we showed in Proposition 1, a higher shared
cost increases the equilibrium prices. Second, a higher level of e loosens the no-hacking
constraint.
With shared protection, if the ﬁrms could collude to set prices, they would
choose (p1,p 2) to maximize
Π
J(p1,p 2)=R1(p1,p 2)+R2(p1,p 2) − K(p1 + p2) (8)
However, if the prices are set independently and the costs of the system are shared
according to demand shares or revenue shares, the collusive prices might be impossible
to reach.
We will again assume that the maximizer of (8) is symmetric, (p1,p 2)=
¡
pJ,p J¢
.L e t eJ =2 pJ. W i t hs h a r e dc o s tK
¡
eJ¢
, price competition leads to the










≥ pJ. If this condition does not hold,
then the ﬁrms must either waste costs of protection to achieve the collusive price pJ
detected and punished. If such postings cannot be deterred, technical protections will not work.
4Since some consumers only want to consume a single product, it might, in fact, be optimal
to choose a lower level of protection that deters most piracy, but does not deter those consumers
with a high demand for both products who would otherwise pay the posted prices. With a weaker
no-hacking constraint, the required level of protection would still be an increasing function of the
prices, but not necessarily equal to their sum. The key requirement for our argument is that higher
prices require more protection. That would reimain true. Although we choose a simple form of the
no-hacking constraint for simplicity, it should be noticed that the line of reasoning in Proposition 3
does not depend on it.
10(choose a protection level higher than eJ) or sell at a lower price. In general, it will
be optimal to do a little of both.
Accounting for the no-hacking constraint as well as cost sharing, the proﬁt
functions for ﬁrm 1 (symmetrically for ﬁrm 2) in games 1, 2 and 3 are the following,
conditional on the level of protection e :
˜ π1(p1,p 2;e)=
½
R1(p1,p 2) − ˜ α1(p1,p 2)K(e) if p1 + p2 ≤ e
−(1/2)K(e) if p1 + p2 >e
¯ π1(p1,p 2;e)=
½
R1(p1,p 2) − ¯ α1(p1,p 2)K(e) if p1 + p2 ≤ e
−(1/2)K(e) if p1 + p2 >e (9)
ˆ π1(p1,p 2;e)=
½
R1(p1,p 2) − ˆ α1K(e) if p1 + p2 ≤ e
−ˆ α1K(e) if p1 + p2 >e
If symmetric equilibria exist in the games deﬁned by the three proﬁt functions

















We now show that whether the ﬁrms can support the collusive outcome pJ
without wasting costs depends on how much of the cost is ﬁxed, that is, independent
of the level of protection. We state this result as Proposition 3, and prove it using
Lemma 2. We add the following assumption about cost:
Assumption 2. T h ec o s to fp r o t e c t i o nK(e) can be written K(e)=k + κ(e)
where κ is convex, positive, and increasing.
For intuition on how costs aﬀect equilibrium prices, refer to Figure 1. Figure
1 depicts symmetric equilibrium prices p
¯ I (κ(e)) for the game with revenue-based cost
sharing. Figure 1 shows that the equilibrium price is increasing in κ(e), hence









I(( ) ) +κ pk e
I(( ) ) +κ
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I(() ) κ  
Figure 1: Equilibrium prices increase with the cost of protection
same feature.) Figure 1 also shows that p
¯ I (k + κ(e)) >p
¯ I (κ(e)) for k>0: if the cost
of protection increases, in particular, because the ﬁxed costs increase, the symmetric
equilibrium prices also increase.




>p J. In that case, the
equilibrium price will be pJ, according to (10). No further argument is needed to










Part (a) of Lemma 2 says that, for high enough ﬁxed costs, the collusive prices
are an equilibrium without wasted costs. That is, if the shared costs are already high
enough, the ﬁrms do not have to increase costs artiﬁcially by increasing the level of
protection e in order to sustain the collusive prices.
Part (b) says that, to achieve the collusive prices without excessive protection
e, the ﬁxed costs must be even higher with revenue-based cost sharing than with
demand-based cost sharing. This is for the reason explored above, that revenue-based
cost sharing makes it harder to sustain high prices. Part (b) also says that if the
ﬁxed costs are lower than required to achieve the collusive prices without excessive
protection, then the ﬁrms can either sustain prices below the collusive price or can
12sustain the collusive price with excessive protection (or, implicitly, some of each).
Part (c) suggests that demand-based cost sharing is more supportive of collusion
than revenue-based cost sharing.
Lemma 2 Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that there are symmetric equi-























J if k ≥ ˜ k
p










J if k ≥ ¯ k
(b) Given κ(e), and ˜ k,¯ k deﬁned in part(a),







˜ I (k + κ(e)) = p
J only if e>e
J.







¯ I (k + κ(e)) = p
J only if e>e
J.









Proof For Lemma 2(a), we must establish that there exists ¯ k high enough that








1 (p1,p 2)=0and (11)
¯ π
¯ k+κ(ej)
1 (p1,p 2)=R1 (p1,p 2)
µ
1 −
¯ k + κ(eJ)
R1 (p1,p 2)+R2 (p1,p 2)
¶
> 0 (12)










<p J, let ¯ k be high enough so that p
¯ I ¡¯ k + κ
¡
eJ¢¢
= pJ as in ﬁgure 1, so
that (11) holds.
14From (5), since (p1,p 2)=
¡
pJ,p J¢
is an equilibrium, it holds at (p1,p 2)=
¡
pJ,p J¢




R1 (p1,p 2) − K
∂
∂p1































On the other hand, pJ is deﬁned by ∂
∂p1R1 (·)+ ∂





∂p1R2 (·) > 0. Remembering that ∂






, the righthand side of (13) is positive, and therefore (12) holds.











by Proposition 1, and since both prices
are increasing in k, it follows that ¯ k>˜ k.
Lemma 2(b) follows from Lemma 2(a) and Proposition 1, as follows. By














pJ. Now suppose p
˜ I (k + κ(e)) = pJ for some arbitrary e,a n dk<˜ k. As κ(e) is





˜ I (k + κ(e)) = pJ implies e>e J. A similar argument
applies for p
¯ I (k + κ(e)).
2(c) follows from 2(a) and 2(b). Q.E.D.
In Proposition 3, we consider the case that the proﬁt-maximizing prices with
ﬁxed cost shares satisfy pM <p J, since otherwise collusion should not be much of a
concern. However, it can happen that the price with perfect legal enforcement or
ﬁxed cost shares, pM, is higher than the collusive price with technical protections, pJ,
since the no-hacking constraint gives an incentive to lower price. An example is in
the next section.
15Proposition 3 (The collusive eﬀe c to fc o s ts h a r i n g )Suppose that assumptions
1a n d2h o l da n dt h a tpM <p J.
(a) Regardless of whether the vendors share costs according to revenue or demand,
for high enough ﬁxed costs of protection (high enough k), the equilibrium price
will be the collusive price pJ,a n deJ =2 pJ.
(b) Demand-based cost sharing supports the collusive price whenever revenue-based
cost sharing does so, but not vice versa.
(c) The ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts are higher (no lower) with demand-based cost shar-
ing than with revenue-based cost sharing.










, then the prices will be pJ,
according to (10). Otherwise, the conclusion follows from Lemma 2(a).
(b) follows from Lemma 2(c).
(c) Given e, there are three cases:
p
J <p
¯ I (K (e)) <p
˜ I (K (e))
p
¯ I (K (e)) <p
J <p
˜ I (K (e))
p
¯ I (K (e)) <p
˜ I (K (e)) <p
J
If the ﬁrst case applies at e = eJ, the prices will equal pJ, according to (10). If the
second case applies at e = eJ, demand-based cost sharing can support the collusive
price according to (10), but revenue-based cost sharing cannot. If the third case applies
at e = eJ, the collusive prices cannot be supported without waste, with either demand-
based or revenue-based cost sharing. But a higher price can be supported at each e
with demand-based cost sharing than with revenue-based cost sharing. Since joint
proﬁt is rising in the symmetric price for p<p J, the higher price is more proﬁtable.
Q.E.D.
164 Choosing Whether to Share a System
In the previous section we introduced the idea that the level of protection is a choice
variable. If the ﬁrms want to charge higher prices, they must spend more money
on protection. The costliness of protection will have a moderating eﬀect on prices.
We now argue that the threat of circumvention also creates a price-moderating eﬀect
when the protection systems are independent.
As i n g l eﬁrm’s no-hacking constraint is
e ≤ p (14)
If K (2p) > 2K (p) it is cheaper to support the prices (p,p) with separate systems, and
if K (2p) < 2K (p), it is cheaper to support the prices (p,p) with a shared system.
The price-moderating eﬀect of the constraint (14) is easiest to see in the case
of a single monopolist, which we consider in the Appendix.5 To support the monopoly
price, the vendor would choose a level of protection such that (14) holds as an equality
at the monopoly price. There is no point in choosing protection higher than the
monopoly price, and lower protection would be ineﬀective. But then, provided the
cost of protection can be reduced by reducing its level, the vendor can save costs
without having a signiﬁcant impact on revenue by slightly reducing both the price
and the level of protection. This can beneﬁt both users and producers. Users beneﬁt
from the lower price, while producers may get protection that lasts longer than the
statutory length of the copyright or patent. An example in the appendix shows that
both users and vendors can e better oﬀ than with perfect legal enforcement.
We now show that a threat of circumvention leads to lower prices also in the
context of competition: If two sellers use separate protection systems, the prices they
charge in competition with each other, which we will call
¡
pI,p I¢




that would arise with perfect legal enforcement.
5This was also noticed in the earlier debate about the pernicious eﬀects of photocopying. See
Conner and Runnelt (1991).
17The ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions if they use separate systems are
Π
I
i(p1,p 2)=Ri(p1,p 2) − K(pi) for i =1 ,2 (15)
where “I” stands for “independent.” We have entered pi as the argument in K,
recognizing that the no-hacking constraint (14) holds for each ﬁrm. To compare
prices in a systematic way, we need some additional assumptions.
Assumption 3. Given the revenue and proﬁt functions deﬁned above:
(a) The cross-partial derivatives of the revenue and proﬁt functions (1) and (15) are
nonnegative.
(b) The revenue and proﬁt functions (1), (8), and (15) are quasiconcave on the do-
mains where they are nonnegative.























1(p0,p 0)=0for both p and p0 when p0 6= p.
Proposition 4 (A threat of circumvention reduces prices) Suppose that Assump-
tion 3 holds. The symmetric prices that result from perfect legal enforcement are higher
than those that result when vendors use separate DRM systems. That is, pM >p I.
Proof We use the Corollary to Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and
Theorem 13 of Milgrom and Shannon, 1994. To show pM >p I,w r i t e
R1(p1,p 2)+tK(p1)
for ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function (symmetrically, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt function), and let t ∈ [−1,0]
deﬁne a class of games. Then t = −1 is the proﬁt function (15) for the game with
18separate technical protections, and t =0is the proﬁt function (1) for the game with
perfect legal enforcement. The class of games deﬁned by t ∈ [−1,0] are symmetric,
(smooth) supermodular, and satisfy the single crossing property. Therefore the unique
symmetric equilibrium prices of the games deﬁned by t are increasing in t,s opM ≥ pI.
One can see from the derivatives that the inequality is strict. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is exactly as for single monopolists, dis-
cussed in the Appendix. Vendors ﬁnd it cheaper to deter hackers by reducing the
price a little rather than by choosing enough protection to support the price that
would be sustainable with perfect legal enforcement.
Consumers and vendors may have conﬂicting interests in a shared system. If
pJ <p I, the shared system has a lower price and is clearly better for consumers.
However the shared system is only better for the vendors if it reduces protection costs
enough to outweigh the proﬁt erosion due to lower prices. Sharing can either increase
or decrease protection costs. Although sharing eliminates half the ﬁxed costs, the need
for more protection may more than oﬀset that saving. Because the shared system is
a better hacking target, it must provide a higher level of protection.
Neither the consumers nor the vendors will have a preference that aligns per-
fectly with eﬃciency. From an ex post point of view, the users care only about price,
and the vendors care only about proﬁt. From an ex ante point of view, the interests
of consumers and vendors are more closely aligned, since consumers would presum-
ably not favor price erosion so severe that it eliminates the incentive to create new
products.
We now give an example to illustrate that the vendors may choose separate
systems even if sharing allows them to implement the collusive price pJ, and even
when sharing is more eﬃcient than separate systems from an ex post point of view.
Example 1 Let ﬁrm 1’s demand be deﬁned as
D1(p1,p 2)=m a x {1 − p1 + cp2,0}
19where 0 ≤ p1,p 2 ≤ 1,a n d0 ≤ c ≤ 1. The parameter c determines the degree of
substitutability between the two products. Firm 2’s demand is symmetrically deﬁned.
Let the costs of protection be deﬁned by
K(e)=k + κe
2
so that k is a ﬁxed cost and 2κe is the marginal cost of increasing the cost of circum-
vention.
When the ﬁrms compete using separate protection systems, ﬁrm 1’s best price
response is
1+cp2
2+2κ (symmetrically for ﬁrm 2), and the symmetric Nash equilibrium









(2 + 2κ − c)2 − k (17)
As noted previously, technical protection moderates the price of content (with
κ>0), compared to perfect legal protection. The equilibrium price with perfect legal
enforcement would be pM = 1
2−c, which is higher than pI.
Suppose now that ﬁrms share a technical protection system, price as a joint
monopolist, and satisfy the no-hacking constraint e = p1 + p2.T h e ﬁrms maximize










(2 + 4κ − 2c)
2 − k (19)
Remark 5 The collusive prices with a shared protection system are higher than the
competitive prices with separate protection systems, pJ >p I,i fa n do n l yi f2κ<c .
This follows directly from (16) and (18). The price-moderating eﬀect of the
20shared protection is increasing in κ, but the collusive eﬀect of joint pricing is increasing
in c. The latter eﬀect dominates if 2κ<c .
From the vendors’ point of view, sharing a protection system may or may
not reduce their protection costs. If sharing increases their costs, they may choose
separate systems even if sharing would allow them to collude on price. We complete
the example by illustrating that point.
Suppose, for example, that the demands for the content are independent (c =0 )
and marginal costs for protection are positive, (κ>0.) According to the remark,
pI >p J, so consumers prefer the shared system, even with collusive pricing. The
vendors’ joint proﬁts are given by (19) or (17) , respectively, when they do and do not





2(1 + 2κ)2 <k (20)
If (20) holds, vendors and consumers both prefer shared protection.
But is sharing the socially eﬃcient option? When c =0 , demands are in-
dependent, and consumers’ surplus in each market at price p is given by s(p)=
(1/2)(1 − p)
2 . The social surplus with sharing, conditional on the products having
been created in the ﬁrst place, is greater than with separate systems if 2s(p
J)+πJ >
2s(p
I)+2 πI,w h i c hh o l d si f
(1 + 2κ)2
4(1 + κ)2 −
(1 + 4κ)2





2(1 + 2κ)2 <k (21)
Because the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two terms of (21) is negative, (21) holds if
(20) holds, but not necessarily vice versa. Thus, for a wide range of parameter values,
ﬁrms will be too reluctant to share a system, relative to what is eﬃcient from an ex
post point of view.
Suppose now that c>0 and κ =0 .T h e npI <p J, so consumers face higher
prices with sharing than with separate protections. Comparing (17) and (19), for
all k ≥ 0,c > 0,w eﬁnd that πI < πJ
2 . Since the collusive prices are higher than
21the competitive prices, and the total costs are smaller, proﬁts are higher with joint
protection.
This example illustrates important features of the DRM problem that we have
discussed above more formally. First, collusion with a shared protection system can
lead to lower prices than the competitive outcome with separate protections, and can
lead to either higher or lower protection costs than separate systems. Second, due to
t h ec o u n t e r i n t u i t i v ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tt h es h a r e ds y s t e mm a yr e d u c ep r i c e sb e l o wt h o s e
that would prevail with separate systems, the vendors might forgo the opportunity
to collude even if sharing reduces costs. That is, the vendors might choose separate
systems even if sharing is more eﬃcient in the sense of reducing deadweight loss and
reducing the costs of protection.
If ex post eﬃciency were the only notion of eﬃciency, this would suggest that
vendors are too reluctant to share, compared to the social optimum, even if sharing
allows them to collude on price. But that perspective does not take account of the
ex ante incentive to create new products in the ﬁrst place. By making the most
proﬁtable decision, the vendors are also preserving their ex ante incentive to create
new products.
5 Collusion through Technology
If the vendors share a protection system, competition between them is aﬀected by two
important aspects of the governance structure:
• whether the vendors set prices independently, and
• how they share costs.
Independence in price setting is obviously key for competition. The new wrinkle
here is that the potential for independent pricing is controlled both by technology and
by the governance of it, such as cost sharing.
22As of the writing of this paper, vendors of entertainment products still sell their
content on physical media, and set their prices independently. The technologies of
DRM systems have evolved hand-in-hand with distribution systems meant to supplant
physical retail channels for content. The technologies and distribution systems are
tightly bound together. For example, one can imagine a future in which all content
is available without charge over the internet, and it is only the right to “render” it
(view it) that is priced. The DRM company then becomes the gateway to pricing,
and a potential facilitator of collusion. How can this be avoided?
One possible ﬁx is to require that the technology allows vendors to set their own
prices.6 But regulating technology seems like a heavy-handed approach. Perhaps,
instead, one can depend on the vendors’ incentives to “cheat” the cartel. Suppose,
for example, that a DRM system decrypts and authorizes use through a call-home
system, imposes a price-per-view for all content (or charges a royalty per view,) and
distributes the net proﬁt to the vendors according to some rule they agree on. If
the DRM company can choose the price and is immune to cheating, it is reasonable
to suppose that, acting on behalf of its vendor-owners, it would choose the proﬁt-
maximizing price and level of protection.
But the DRM cartel, like all cartels, must worry about price cutting. An
obvious way for a vendor to undermine the cartel and increase its own proﬁta tt h e
expense of others is to oﬀer rebates outside the DRM system, perhaps oﬀering a
“frequent user” program. Rebates implicitly reduce the price and increase demand.
This would ordinarily be a capability favored by antitrust authorities, but it comes
at the expense of privacy. Under the hypothesis that all content is given away for
free, and only the “rendering” is sold, the vendors can only make rebates if someone,
presumably the DRM subsidiary itself, keeps track of the buyers.
In yet another twist, however, if the vendors are pricing outside the DRM
system, it is almost inevitable that they will share the costs according to downloads
instead of revenue, since that is what the protection system tracks. We have shown
6Notice, for example, that iTunes does not have that capability.
23that demand-based cost sharing has greater potential to support the collusive price
than revenue-based cost sharing.
Short of regulating technology, it is not obvious how to ensure independent
pricing.
6 Conclusions and Open Questions
B a c k t r a c k i n gab i t ,i ti sa l s on o to b v i o u si nt h eb r a v en e ww o r l do fD R Mt h a ti n d e p e n -
dence in price setting should be the goal. The main appeal of independence in price
setting is that it seems to mimic the market outcome with perfect legal enforcement.
But neither a shared system nor separate systems will mimic that outcome perfectly.
With separate DRM systems, the vendors’ prices will be lower than with perfect legal
enforcement, and the vendors will also be burdened with the cost of the DRM system.
Incentives to create content are correspondingly lower than with perfect legal enforce-
ment. Sharing a system may increase the vendors’ proﬁt, but may either overreward
them or underreward them. Technical protect i o n st h u sc h a n g et h em a r k e tf o rc r e a t i v e
works in fundamental ways, and the best approach may be an integrative one that
rethinks the nature of copyright protection from the ground up.
As well as exploring the price consequences of sharing a DRM system, we have
explored the vendors’ incentive to share. A shared system may or may not be less
costly than separate systems, and it may or may not lead to higher prices. Thus,
from an ex post point of view, it is unclear whether sharing is more eﬃcient. However,
the vendors’ decision will track proﬁt, not eﬃciency. Sharing can increase proﬁti fi t
facilitates high prices or reduces costs, relative to separate systems. In looking out for
their proﬁt, the vendors are preserving their incentive to create proprietary products
in the ﬁrst place. Thus, even if they make sharing decisions which are nonoptimal
from an ex post point of view, their decisions may be optimal from an ex ante point
of view.
24We have explored one possible way that the market could evolve, namely, with
vendors owning their own protection systems, either jointly or separately. Another
possibility is that third party providers will market protection services to vendors and
users, as in “two-sided markets” (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2004). The possibility of
circumvention introduces a new variant to such markets, since a threat of circumven-
tion creates externalities among vendors. If the other vendors charge very high prices
for very attractive content, the system becomes an attractive hacking target. A ven-
dor might therefore prefer a system with fewer vendors or lower prices. With that
possibility, it is natural to think of a market populated by many competing third-party
providers, each connecting vendors with users. We leave that for a future inquiry.
7 Appendix: The Price-Reducing Eﬀect of Techni-
cal Protections
Here we show that a regime of technical protections under a threat of circumvention
leads to a lower price than a regime of perfect legal enforcement. This can result in
higher beneﬁts for both users and the vendor. Users beneﬁt through lower price, and
the vendor may beneﬁt from longer protection.







We assume that the marginal cost of copying is zero. Thus, if copying can be con-
trolled, the monopoly price will be p∗ = 1
2, which maximizes per-period proﬁt,
π(p)=p(1 − p).
However, if the copies cannot be controlled, the demand curve for legitimate copies
falls to zero. Technical protection measures can mitigate this problem.
Index the strength of protection by e ∈ R+, and interpret e as the cost of
circumvention. Formalizing the intuition that the cost of protection increases super-
25linearly in the cost of circumvention, denote the cost of implementing protection level
e by K(e) > 0, where K and K0 are increasing. We shall ﬁrst suppose that the cost of
circumvention is the same for all users, namely, e. After the right holder has chosen
the strength of protection, e,h em u s ts e tap r i c e . I fe>p ∗, then the optimal price is
p∗. It is therefore wasteful to implement a protection e>p ∗, since the proprietor does
not need such strong protection in order to charge the monopoly price. If e<p ∗,
the optimal price is p = e, the cost of circumvention. At that price, no users will
circumvent the technical protection measure in equilibrium.
Thus, for any e ≤ p∗, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt as a function of e is π(e) − K(e),w h e r e
both π and K are increasing, and π ﬂattens out for e>p ∗. The proﬁt-maximizing
level of protection, say ˆ e, maximizes the diﬀerence between proﬁt and cost, and must
be lower than p∗.T h u s ,
Remark 6 If each user’s cost of circumvention is e when the protection level is e,
the proﬁt-maximizing level of protection ˆ e satisﬁes ˆ e<p ∗, where p∗ is the proﬁt-
maximizing price with perfect legal enforcement. The proﬁt-maximizing price satisﬁes
ˆ p =ˆ e<p ∗. There is no circumvention in equilibrium.
Thus the threat of circumvention lowers the price of content. We show in the
appendix that dispersion in circumvention costs may lower it even more.
While the price and proﬁt are lower in each period, the technical protection
can continue forever, and may thus be more proﬁtable than perfect legal enforcement,
which eventually expires. This may even be true if the costs K are taken into account.
Moreover, it is not obvious that the threat of circumvention increases consumer welfare,
even though it reduces the per-period price. This is again because the technical
protection can continue indeﬁnitely. In fact, a technical protection system can increase
both consumer welfare and the proprietor’s proﬁt, as compared with perfect legal
enforcement for a limited duration. We will show this in an example, but ﬁrst we
make a preliminary comment on the optimal structure of rewards to creation.
26For each p, let DWL(p) b et h el o s tc o n s u m e r s ’s u r p l u sa tt h ep r i c ep (dead-
weight loss). Remark 2 says that if a lower price is coupled with longer protection to
j u s tt h ee x t e n tt h a tt o t a lp r o ﬁt is preserved, and if this has the eﬀect of reducing the
deadweight-loss-to-proﬁt ratio, consumers are better oﬀ. This ratio test is satisﬁed
for linear demand curves, as assumed here.
By assuming that revenue is held ﬁxed, Remark 2 focuses on the optimal struc-
ture of rewards ex post. It allows us to consider ex post eﬃciency without considering
the ex ante incentive to create. In the remainder of this paper, where we consider gov-
ernance structures for sharing technical protections, the ex ante and ex post eﬃciency
issues are not so easy to disentangle.
Remark 7 S u p p o s eal e g a lr e g i m el a s t sT∗ discounted years7 with monopoly price p∗,
and suppose a technical protection regime lasts T(e) discounted years, T(e) >T ∗ with
price p(e) that satisﬁes p(e) <p ∗. Suppose that the revenue earned in both regimes is







Proof Since p(e) <p ∗, the per-period consumers’ surplus is higher, s(p(e)) >











7The length of protection T is taken to be already discounted. If the statutory length of protection
is τ, and the discount rate is r, then T =
R τ
0 e−rtdt. The discounted length of protection, T, cannot
be larger than 1
r, which corresponds to τ = ∞.
8The ratio test for whether a simultaneous price reduction and lengthening of protection helps
consumers was introduced in the antitrust context by Kaplow 1984 to evaluate the desirability of
licensing practices, and in the patent design context by Tandon (1982) and many subsequent authors
(see Scotchmer (2005), chapter 4) to evaluate the desirability of making patents broad or narrow.
The notable feature of the ratio test is that the comparison is reduced to a static one. Even though
deadweight loss lasts longer in the technical protection regime, we only have to observe that the ratio
of deadweight loss to proﬁt is reduced in each period in order to know whether in total the technical
protection regime is better for consumers.
27where s(0) = 1
2 is the per-period consumers’ surplus after the protection ends, when








for consumers’ surplus with the technical protection in place. Consumers are better
oﬀ with technical protection of length T(e) if and only if:
[s(0) − s(p
∗)]T
∗ − [s(0) − s(p(e))]T(e) > 0 (24)
Remark 2 follows from the observation that the consumers’ surplus that is lost





s(0) − s(p(e)) = π(p(e)) + DWL(p(e))
Then, using T∗π(p∗)=T(e)π(p(e)), the inequality (24) holds if and only if (23) holds.
Q.E.D.
However, this conceptual experiment is not quite the right one for comparing
costless enforcement of copyrights with technical protections. Technical protections
can continue forever — protection will not end at the duration T(e) required for the
proﬁt equivalence. Further, technical protections are costly. Nevertheless, this line
of reasoning correctly suggests that technical protections can sometimes make both
creators and consumers better oﬀ. We show this with an example.
Example: As argued above, if there is no dispersion of circumvention costs, the optimal
price with a technical protection is p(e)=e. Thus, consumers’ surplus per period of
time with technical protection is s(p(e)) = 1
2(1 − e)2.























[e(1 − e) − K(e)] (26)
Let the cost function K be given by
K(e)=
½ 1






Ayres, I., and P. Klemperer. 1999. “Limiting Patentees’ Market Power without Reduc-
ing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Beneﬁts of Uncertainty and Noninjunctive
Remedies.” Michigan Law Review 97:985-1033.
Belleﬂamme, P. 2003. “Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying.” W.J.
G o r d o n ,R .W a t t s ,e d s .The Economics of Copyright: Developments in Research and
Analysis. Edward Elgar Publishers.
Besen, S., and S. Kirby. 1989. “Private Copying, Appropriability and Optimal Copyright
Royalties.” Journal of Law and Economics 32:255-275.
Chen, Y. and I. Png. 2003. “Information Goods, Pricing, and Copyright Enforcement:
Welfare Analysis” Information Systems Research 14:107-123
Conner, K. R. and R. P. Rumelt. 1991. “Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protecting
Strategies.” Management Science 37:125-139.
Conseil de la Concurrence. 2004. Press Release regarding VirginMega v. Apple Com-
puter.
Gayer, A. and O. Shy. 2004. “Publishers, Artists and Copyright Enforcement.” Mimeo-
graph. Haifa, Israel: Department of Economics, University of Haifa.
Johnson, W. R. 1985. “The Economics of Copying.” Journal of Political Economy
93:158-174.
Kaplow, L. 1984. “The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal.” Harvard Law
Review 97:1813-1892.
Klein, J. 1997 “Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Ltd., General Instruments
Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., Mitsubishi
Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V., Scientiﬁc-Atlanta Inc., and Sony Corp., Cable
Television Laboratories Inc., MPEG LA L.L.C.” United States Department of Justice
30Business Review Letter.
Klein, J. 1999 “Hitachi, Ltd., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Elec-
tric Corp., Time Warner Inc., Toshiba Corp., and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd.”
United States Department of Justice Business Review Letter.
Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. 1990. “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in
Games with Strategic Complementarities.” Econometrica 58:1255-1277.
Milgrom, P., and Shannon, C. 1994. “Monotone Comparative Statics.” Econometrica
67:157-180.
Novos, I., and M. Waldman. 1984. “The Eﬀects of Increasing Copyright Protection: An
Analytic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 92:236-246.
Scotchmer, S. 2004. Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shapiro, C. 2001. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting.” Innovation Policy and the Economy 1:119-150.
Shy, O. and J.-F. Thisse. 1999. “A Strategic Approach to Software Protection.” Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy 8:163-190.
Sundararajan, Arum. 2004. “Managing Digital Piracy: Pricing, Protection and Wel-
fare.” Working paper. New York: Stern School of Business, NYU.
Tandon, P. 1982. “Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing.” Journal of Political
Economy 90:470-486.
31